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Abstract: This paper explores the link between crime and corruption, compares their 
magnitudes, determinants and their effects on growth rates. The study uses a large cross country 
data set containing individual responses to questions on crime and corruption along with 
information on the respondents’ characteristics. This data set is supplemented by country level 
indicators from a variety of sources on a range of macro variables and on institutions in the 
respondent’s country of residence. A methodological contribution of this study is the estimation 
of an ordered probit model based on outcomes defined as combinations of crime and bribe 
victimisation. The principal results include the evidence that while a male is more likely to be a 
corruption victim, a female is more exposed to crime, especially, serious crime. Older 
individuals and those living in the smaller towns and cities are less exposed to crime and 
corruption due presumably to their ability to form informal networks that act as protective 
mechanisms. With increasing levels of income and education, an individual is more likely to 
report both crime and bribe victimisation. A crime victim is more likely than a non victim to 
report receiving demands for a bribe. The results suggest that variables such as inequality, 
unemployment rate and population size have a strong effect on the country’s crime and 
corruption statistics though the sign and significance of the country effects are not always robust. 
However, the paper does provide robust evidence that a stronger legal system and a happier 
society result in a reduction in both crime and corruption. While the study finds that both crime 
and corruption rates decline as a country becomes more affluent, as measured by its per capita 
GNP at PPP,  there is no evidence of a strong and uniformly negative impact of either crime or 
corruption on a country’s growth rate. There is limited OLS based evidence of a non linear 
relationship between growth and corruption rates, though the significance of the corruption effect 
on growth disappears on the use of IV estimation. The paper also provides evidence that there 
has been a decline in both crime and corruption during the latter half of the 1990s. This is true 
even after controlling for the individual and country characteristics.  
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1.  Introduction  
There are several similarities and contrasts between the literatures on the economics of crime and 
corruption. They have grown in parallel but have rarely intersected. While both these literatures 
are predicated on concerns over the adverse economic and social consequences of such illegal 
behaviour, there are differences in emphasis and motivation in the research on these twin 
phenomena. The corruption literature has a longer history. For example, Bardhan (1997) traces 
the early literature on corruption to the work of the classical Indian scholar, Kautilya, in fourth 
century BC. In more recent times, Myrdal (1968) in his celebrated text, Asian Drama, has 
discussed the endemic problem of corruption in South Asia. An example of early public concern 
over corruption is evident in the setting up of a high level committee, called the Santhanam 
Committee, in the early 1960s, by the Government of India to look at ways of preventing 
corruption. As Myrdal notes, though corruption was a significant issue in public discussions, the 
subject of corruption was taboo in research on development especially in the South Asian 
context. Mauro(1995)’s influential work, that suggested that corruption has an adverse effect on 
growth by reducing private investment, coinciding with increasing concern among the donor 
countries that the effectiveness of aid is reduced by corruption led to a proliferation of literature 
on corruption
1. While Mauro’s paper that caused a revival of interest in this ancient phenomenon 
was on the effects of corruption, much of the recent work has been on its determinants. Treisman 
(2000), Paldam (2002), Mocan (2008), Chatterjee and Ray (2009) are examples of recent studies 
that examine on cross country data the determinants of corruption
2. While the earlier empirical 
literature, including Mauro’s (1995) influential findings on corruption, was based on data on the 
perceptions of corruption collected by the Transparency International and Business International, 
                                                            
1 See Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001) and Mishra (2005) for recent surveys of the literature on corruption. 
2 While most of the empirical studies on corruption related to the individual’s experience of corruption as a citizen, a 
recent study by Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008)  reported firm level corruption resulting from non 
reporting of a certain proportion of the firm’s sales activity. 2 
 
increasing concern over the subjective biases inherent in such data has led to the use of cross 
sectional survey data containing unit record information
3 on individuals’ bribery experiences.  
The economics literature on crime has a somewhat different origin and orientation. It is more 
recent than the corruption literature and is more closely integrated with the micro based theory of 
individual behaviour
4, thanks to the pioneering work of Becker (1968) leading to a stream of 
significant analytical contributions that analysed criminal behaviour and issues of criminal 
justice
5 followed by empirical investigations. The research in both corruption and crime was set 
off by concerns over their consequences. However, while the recent interest in corruption can be 
attributed to its negative macro economic consequences on efficiency and distribution, the 
literature on crime has focussed more on the physical and emotional effects on the victims of 
crime. The effects of crime are more individualistic and directly and immediately observable 
with, in many cases, tragic consequences. In contrast, the effects of corruption on its victims are 
less drastic and visible though, at least in the long run, it can have similar tragic consequences. 
Consequently, while there is a need for urgency in crime prevention, particularly in the wake of a 
violent crime that attracts media attention, this is not quite so in the case of bribery or corruption. 
Neither as a political imperative nor as a research agenda has the discussion on anti corruption 
measures attracted quite the same degree of public or academic attention as crime prevention. 
While the discussion in the crime literature has focussed more on the strategies to reduce crime 
by deterring criminal activities, the literature on bribery/corruption
6 has been much less 
concerned with the normative policy issues and more with the positive behavioural aspects such 
as the effects and determinants of corruption. Consequently, the corruption literature
7 has not 
                                                            
3  Svensson (2003), Mocan (2008) and Chatterjee and Ray (2009) are examples of this recent trend. 
4 This is not to suggest that the corruption literature is devoid of micro theoretic contributions altogether-see, for 
example, the contributions in the volume edited by Mishra (2005). The corruption literature lacks the rich theoretical 
antecedent of the crime literature that is provided by the seminal contributions of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1981). 
5 These include Stigler (1970), Ehrlich (1973, 1981), Witte (1980), and Levitt (1998). See Cameron (1988), Levitt 
(1998) and Buonanno (2003) for a more comprehensive list of references. 
6 The two terms are used synonymously in this paper. 
7 The corruption literature has not been free of debates either. Mauro’s (1995) original result of a negative 
relationship between corruption and growth rates could not be reproduced in Svensson (2005), Mendez and 3 
 
seen the sort of policy debates that have characterised the crime literature with, for example, 
Witte (1980) arguing that the severity and certainty of punishment can deter crime, while Myers 
(1983) argues the opposite, namely, that “increases in the certainty of punishment are positively 
related to participation in crime” (p.157). Ehrlich (1981) uses FBI data on crimes and arrest to 
argue that “efficient crime control requires only the imposition of deterring punishments or the 
promotion of general legitimate earning opportunities, without any attempt at individual control” 
(p. 319). Grogger (1991) uses a large data set on crime to measure the deterrence and 
incapacitation effects and estimate the effect of earnings and employment on criminal activity. 
Levitt (1998) contributes to this debate by distinguishing between the deterrence and 
incapacitation aspects of crime prevention and observing that “deterrence appears to be 
empirically more important than incapacitation in reducing crime...” (p. 369).  
In recent years, there has been some convergence of the literatures on crime and corruption with 
a common focus on empirical research on their determinants. A combination of single country 
studies with investigations on cross country data sets has characterised both the empirical 
literatures, though cross country investigations seem to dominate single country studies in the 
corruption literature much more than in the crime literature. A possible reason could be the fact 
that while there are several common features in corruption across countries, the features and 
determinants of crime are unique to every country and are context specific. This also partly 
reflects the fact that the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the 
Business International Index (BI) on which much of the earlier empirical literature on corruption 
was based involve corruption scores for a wide cross section of countries. There has not been, 
until recently, a comparable cross country data set on crime. This has changed recently with the 
availability of the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the United Nations World 
Crime Surveys. Fajnzylber et. al. (2002) use the latter cross country data set on crime for a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Sepulveda (2006), Chatterjee and Ray (2009). Again, Gupta, et. al. (2002)’s result that high corruption increases 
inequality and poverty was directly contradicted by Li, et. al. (2000) who found an inverted U relationship between 
corruption and inequality with high corruption countries having low inequality.  4 
 
sample of developed and developing countries for the period 1970-1994 to find that increases in 
income inequality raise crime rates. This parallels the corruption result of You and Khagram 
(2005), also on cross country data, that growing inequality increases the level of corruption. 
Earlier, on international data involving a more limited set of countries, namely, England, Japan 
and the U.S. ( as represented by California). Wolpin (1980) examined the extent to which 
deterrence, environment and culture can explain the variation in criminal behaviour between 
these three countries. Another significant distinction between the crime and corruption data sets 
is that while the former is based on actual incidence of crime, the latter has until recently been 
based on the perception of corruption. Consequently, while the crime literature has tended to 
distinguish between different forms of crime, most notably, between violent and property crimes 
[see, for example, Fajnzynlber, et. al. (2002), Kelly (2000)], the corruption literature has not 
emphasised the distinction between different forms of corruption to the same extent
8.   
Until recently, there has been no attempt to investigate empirically the link between criminal and 
corrupt behaviour. This was largely due to the lack of data sets that contained simultaneous 
information on both types of illegitimate activities. For example, the corruption perceptions data 
across countries did not contain comparable information on the perception of criminal behaviour 
in those countries. Correspondingly, the data on crimes, typically available on a country by 
country basis, did not contain information on corrupt practices in those countries. The situation 
has changed recently with the availability of micro data on crime and corruption at the level of 
individuals. Hunt (2007) has used such a data set from Peru to investigate the link between crime 
and corruption and finds that “crime victims are much more likely than non victims to bribe 
public officials” (p.574). In an earlier study, Hunt (2006) found that such a result holds on cross-
                                                            
8 Once again, this could be reflecting the empirical literature’s reliance on the corruption perception indices which 
do not provide perception scores by different forms of corruption. In contrast, most of the data sets on which the 
crime literature is based distinguish between different forms of crime. Chatterjee and Ray (2009) provide a 
departure in the corruption literature by comparing between individual and business corruption using alternative data 
sets on corruption.  5 
 
country data as well. As far as we are aware, there have not been any previous or subsequent 
empirical attempts to link the two types of illegitimate behaviour.  
The investigation of a possible association between criminal and corrupt behaviour is the 
principal motivation of the present study. We attempt to answer the question: Is a crime victim 
more likely to be asked for a bribe? We use a rich international data set containing micro 
information on both criminality and bribery at the level of individuals, across countries and over 
time, to compare the incidence of crime and corruption and how they have changed over time, 
compare the sign and magnitude of the determinants of crime and corruption, estimate the effect 
of crime victimisation on corruption exposure, examine and compare the distributions of crime 
and corruption across countries and their variation with living standards. While the corruption 
literature contains plenty of evidence, though not always unanimous, on the effect of corruption 
on growth, there is no such evidence in the crime literature on the effect of criminal behaviour on 
a country’s growth. This study uses the cross country information to provide such evidence on 
this important policy issue. Against the background of Mauro’s (1995) celebrated result that 
corruption lowers growth, we investigate whether increased criminal activities adversely affects 
economic growth as well.  
We exploit a unique feature of the data set that it contains responses from the same individual to 
questions on crime and corruption. Moreover, since the same organisation, namely, the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) was involved in designing 
the questionnaires for all the countries, the issue of comparability that affects all cross country 
comparisons is unlikely to have posed a significant problem in this case. Another advantage of 
the present data set is that, while individuals and firms are reluctant to give their true responses 
on crime and corruption to government agencies, they are more forthcoming when responding to 
questions from non-governmental organisations. 6 
 
 A significant feature of this study is the combination of the information on the characteristics of 
the respondents available in the micro data sets with the country level macro indicators obtained 
from a variety of sources to analyse both the micro and macro determinants of crime and 
corruption. The country level indicators range from compliance institutions such as the rule of 
law and regulatory mechanism to welfare measures such as inequality, happiness and 
unemployment. While the evidence on crime and corruption, especially, how they have moved 
over time are of interest on their own, the emphasis here is on a comparison between them and 
examination of the nature and magnitude of their association.  
Another distinguishing feature of this study is the differentiation that is made here between 
“serious” and “light” crimes. Such a distinction is made not on the basis of an ad hoc definition 
of “serious crime” by the data collector but on the basis of the victim’s own, admittedly 
subjective, view of the nature of the crime. Moreover, in focussing attention on the 
characteristics of the victim, this study aims to build up the profile of an individual who is 
exposed to either form of victimisation. While much of the empirical literature on crime has been 
motivated with a view to contributing to the debate on alternative crime control measures such as 
rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence, the present study is more concerned with the victim, 
be it a crime or bribery victim, by building up a profile of an individual who is particularly 
vulnerable and should be targeted for protection. In his survey of the literature on crime, 
Cameron (1988) had observed that “there is still scope for future developments. These could 
profitably be in greater exploration of victimisation surveys...” (p. 315). Two decades on, this 
comment is still valid. The present study takes a hopefully significant step in acting on Cameron 
(1988)’s suggestion.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data set used in this study. Section 3 
reports and compares the summary evidence on crime and corruption. Section 4 presents probit 
estimates of crime and corruption and compares their determinants. A significant feature of this 7 
 
section is that it contains evidence of the impact of crime victimisation on exposure to 
corruption. This section also presents and compares the effects of the level of inequality and 
happiness in a country on the magnitude of crime and corruption prevailing in that country. 
Section 5 presents and compares the effects of crime and corruption on growth rates. Section 6 
summarises the principal results and concludes the paper. 
2.  Data Description
9 
The data set used in this study came from the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) that is 
collected by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). 
The ICVS project started in 1989. To date, the ICVS data base covers the period, 1989-2005.One 
of the most comprehensive in its coverage, the ICVS data set covers a wide range of countries. 
The data set covers both EU
10 and non EU countries. An attractive feature of this data set is that 
the same individual was asked a range of questions covering her/his experience as a possible 
victim of both crime and corruption. The respondent was also asked if, in case she/he was a 
crime victim, she/he considered the crime to be “very serious”, “fairly serious” or “not very 
serious”. In this study, we define a “serious crime” to be one where the crime victim felt that the 
alleged crime was “very serious” or “fairly serious”. A “light crime” or “non serious crime” is 
one where the crime victim considered it to have been “not very serious”. A standard set of data 
analysis tools has been developed over the years to ensure that choice of data analysis that have 
been made in the past are applied over time and also between countries. Two types of 
methodologies have been developed over the years, Cati methodology for the countries with high 
telephone penetration, and face to face methodology for the countries with low telephone 
penetration. In most cases, the latter are restricted to the capital city. This introduces a city bias 
in the responses to questions on crime and corruption in the case of many of the developing 
                                                            
9 The data description has been taken from the websites: http://www.unicri.it/ and http://rechten.uvt.nl/icvs. The 
interested reader is referred to these websites for further details. 
10 The data from the EU countries is available separately. For access to the EU ICVS data, see 
http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/ . 8 
 
countries. If, as seems likely, crime and corruption in many less developed countries are largely 
restricted to the cities and the urban metropolitan centres, the ICVS scores are likely to suffer 
from an upward bias in case of the poorer countries. This is analogous to the cultural bias in case 
of the CPI scores of developing countries which is also likely to introduce an upward bias in 
corruption perception in such countries. In case of the industrialised countries, the response rates 
have shown a steady improvement over the years, up from a 43 % response rate in 1989 to a 67 
% response rate in 1996. UNICRI was responsible for the face to face questionnaire and 
monitoring of the ICVS in the developing and transition countries. In 1996, the response rates in 
developing countries were on average 95 %, ranging from a minimum of 86 % in Botswana to a 
maximum of 99 % in South Africa, the Philippines and Bolivia. 
The ICVS data on crime consisted of responses to questions on the following 13 types of 
criminal offence: car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, theft of motorcycle/moped, bicycle 
theft, burglary, attempt at burglary, theft from garages, robbery, theft of personal property, 
sexual offences, assaults and threats, and consumer fraud. In case of each type of criminal 
offence, the respondent was asked not only whether she/he was a victim but also, if a victim, 
whether the crime was considered “serious”, “fairly serious” or otherwise by the respondent In 
this study, we defined a respondent to have been a crime victim if she/he reported being a victim 
of any of the 13 types of crimes. Moreover, we define a “serious crime” victim as one who 
reports at least one incident of “serious or fairly serious crime” as viewed by that respondent. All 
other crime victims were treated as “non serious crime” victims.  
The ICVS data on corruption was based on the individual’s response to the question: [During the 
past year] has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector 
in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his services? The responses, 
combined with a host of personal and household information, constituted the data set for this 
study. This information was supplemented by a set of country level characteristics that have been 9 
 
listed (with scores) in Appendix C of the paper by Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) 
and in Table 4 of the study by Mocan (2008). A comprehensive listing of the abbreviated 
variable names and data sources for the country level indicators appears in Appendix Table A2. 
This study used the information contained in the 4 ICVS surveys carried out between 1991 and 
2003. More specifically, surveys conducted during 1992-94 are categorised under the 1991 
sweep, those during 1995-98 under the 1995 sweep, those from 1999-2002 under the 1999 sweep 
and those during 2003-05 under the 2003 sweep. We shall refer to these years as Sweeps 1- 4.  
3.  Summary Evidence on Crime and Corruption 
The average rates of crime and corruption, calculated by country and year, are presented in 
Appendix Table A1 in all cases where such information is available. The list of countries 
considered in this study and mentioned in Table A1 range from some of the poorest countries in 
Africa to the more affluent countries in the EU and North America. The summary measures 
show that there is generally a positive association between the crime and corruption rates and 
that both these rates tend to decline as we move to the richer and more developed countries 
across the development spectrum. For example, crime rates of 0.995 in Tanzania and 0.976 in 
Uganda in 1991contrast sharply with crime rates of 0.557 in the U.S.A. and 0.569 in the U.K. in 
1995.This table provides the disaggregation of crime rates between “serious crime rates” (SCR) 
and “non serious or light crime rates”
11 (LCR). This table also provides the bribe/crime ratios 
and the share of serious (SC) and non serious (LC) crime cases in the total number of crime 
victims. The bribe crime ratio shows that the number of crime victims not only far exceeds the 
number of bribe victims in all countries but so does the number of serious crime cases. The 
majority of crime victims regard the crime committed against them as “serious” as is evident 
from the fact that in nearly all cases the share of “serious crime” in total crime is well above 
0.60. This table also shows that the light crime rates are generally lower, and the serious crime 
                                                            
11 The terms “non serious” and “light crimes” are used synonymously in this paper. 10 
 
rates higher, in the poorer countries than in the more affluent ones. The same is true of the 
composition of crime, as viewed by the victims themselves, between serious and light crime. 
The nature and magnitude of association between crime and bribery is depicted in Figures 1-3. 
They plot the scatter points representing a combination of average bribe and crime rates for a 
particular country, and draw the Lowess Plots based on the scatters. While Figure 1 shows the 
association between crime (overall) and bribery rates across countries, Figures 2 and 3 show, 
respectively, the corresponding association between serious crime and bribery rates , and light 
crime and bribery rates. The association between serious crime and bribery rates is positive and 
stronger than that between light crime and bribery rates. It is worth noting that while serious 
crime rates tend to increase monotonically with bribery rates, the light crime rates have a non 
monotonic relationship with bribery rates. The asymmetric pattern between serious and light 
crime is also seen from Figures 4-6 which show, respectively, the relationship between crime 
rates, serious crime rates and light crime rates and per capita GNP at PPP. As the country gets 
richer and enjoys higher living standards, the serious and (overall) crime rates both come down, 
but the light crime rates increase and register a mild decrease only at higher levels of per capita 
GNP. Figure 7 highlights the discussion by presenting the three graphs in the same Figure 
without the scatter points. The corresponding relation between bribery and GNP is depicted in 
Figure 8 which shows that, similar to serious crime rates, bribery rates decline as a country 
enjoys higher living standards. It is worth noting that the association between serious crime and 
GNP is very close to that between bribery and GNP in both magnitude and direction. As a 
further comparison, Figure 9 plots the bribe to crime ratio against GNP and finds a fairly strong 
negative relationship. As a country gets richer, the number of bribe cases goes down much faster 
than the number of crime cases so that their ratio declines quite rapidly. A poorer country not 
only experiences higher bribe and crime rates, the seriousness of the crimes increase there as 
well.      11 
 
The distribution of countries with respect of crime (overall), serious crime, light crime and bribes 
are presented for each sweep as kernel density plots in Figures10-13, respectively. We present 
below each figure the principal summary statistics of the corresponding kernel density graph. 
Due to insufficient number of observations, we did not calculate the country averages or draw 
the graphs for bribery in the first sweep .The median values show that, during the period 
considered, serious crime and bribery rates have both gone down sharply. The incidence of 
serious crime and crime (overall) increased marginally during the first half of the 1990s and then 
declined quite sharply during the late 1990s and the early part of the new millennium. In 
contrast, the light crime rates have been fairly static. Figure 13 and the summary measures below 
that figure show that there was a continuous and sharp decrease in the incidence of bribery 
during the latter half of the 1990s. The overall message from these figures is that as the transition 
economies and the poorer developing countries after a period of sluggishness in the early 1990s 
saw a significant increase in their living standards, their crime and bribe rates declined during the 
latter half of the 1990 s and beyond in the new millennium. The composition of crime shifted 
towards “light crime” away from “serious crime” as viewed by the victims themselves.  
The relation between bribe and growth rates has attracted much discussion in the corruption 
literature with Mauro (1995)’s result of a negative association between the two rates triggering a 
large literature. In contrast, there is no evidence or discussion of any association between crime 
and growth rates in the crime literature. One would also expect a negative relationship here since 
the forces that cause high bribery rates to lower growth by reducing investment (both domestic 
and foreign) are similar to those that should cause higher crime rates to undermine business 
confidence and hence constrain economic growth. Figure 14 presents evidence on this by 
plotting the 4 graphs in one figure. Consistent with the result presented in Svensson (2005) and 
Chatterjee and Ray (2009), we find no evidence of the celebrated strong and uniformly negative 12 
 
relationship, due to Mauro (1995), between corruption and growth rates
12. This paper extends the 
result to find a similar absence of a strong negative relationship between crime and growth rates. 
The correlation magnitudes confirm the lack of a strong association between both corruption and 
growth rates and between crime and growth rates. Serious crime and crime (overall) have a 
negative association with growth only for countries with high crime rates, i.e. crime rates in 
excess of 0.5. Such countries exhibit a negative relationship between serious crime and growth 
rates. The graphs indicate that, over the ranges of the crime/corruption rates that prevail in the 
more affluent countries (i.e. corruption rates between 0.0 and 0.3, and light crime rates between 
0.0 and 0.4) corruption and light crime act as a greater constraint on growth rates than serious 
crime.  
The overall message from these graphs, namely, Figures 7, 8 and 14, is as follows. We do not 
find overwhelming evidence that either corruption or crime has a strong association with growth 
rates that is uniformly negative at all values of crime and corruption rates. The limited evidence 
that does emerge from these graphs is that for poorer countries (i.e. typically those with per 
capita GNP less than $20000), serious crime and crime (in general) have a negative impact on 
growth. As a country develops and living standards improve and crime rates drop, light crime 
and corruption take over as significant impediments to growth. The range of per capita GNP 
between $20,000 and $30,000 is the dividing range where the constraint on growth shifts from 
serious crime to corruption and light crime.    
4.  The Determinants of Crime and Corruption 
The probit regression estimates of crime and corruption on a selection of individual and country 
characteristics have been presented in the two halves of Table 1. This Table also presents the 
                                                            
12 The OLS estimates presented later show, however, that corruption impacts significantly and nonlinearly on 
growth rates. Consistent with the backward bending curve in Figure14 showing the relationship between growth and 
corruption rates, the OLS estimates suggest that at very low levels of corruption, it impacts positively on growth 
rates but as one crosses a threshold corruption rate of around 0.16 or 16 %, it impacts negatively on growth. 
 13 
 
corresponding probit coefficient estimates for serious crime rates. The corresponding marginal 
effects have been reported in Table 2. There are some interesting similarities between the effects 
of the various individual and country characteristics on an individual’s exposure to crime, 
serious crime and corruption victimisation.  
The size of a town’s population has strong and similar effects on both crime and bribery. 
Residents of a large town (the default category), i.e. one with a population size of more than 1 
million people, are more likely to witness both crime and corruption than those in less populated 
places. Hunt (2006)’s explanation of this result in the corruption context, through the formation 
of informal net works in the smaller towns and cities as anti corruption mechanisms, holds for 
crimes as well. In the larger towns and cities, such networks that act as protective mechanisms 
are more difficult to form making the individual more vulnerable to both crime and bribe 
demands. The gender effects differ in both sign and significance between the two forms of 
victimisation. Males are more likely to be approached with bribe offers than females but females 
are more prone to being crime victims than males. The weak statistical significance of the effect 
of gender on crime victimisation contrasts sharply with the strong significance of gender effect 
on bribe victimisation. Note also that the gender effect on serious crime victimisation is much 
stronger in both size and significance than non serious or light crime. With increasing age, 
individuals are less exposed to both crime and bribery. Individuals in the oldest age category, 60 
years and above, are least exposed to both crime and bribery compared to those in the default age 
group of less than 35 years. Married individuals are less likely than non married individuals to be 
crime victims, but the reverse is true in case of corruption victimisation. Working men and 
women are less exposed to crimes but more exposed to corruption than non working individuals. 
The latter result is explained by the possibilities of corruption that open up due to work related 
contact. Individuals in the higher income brackets and the more educated ones are more likely to 14 
 
be victims of crime and bribery than those who are poorer and less educated
13. Individuals who 
are crime victims also report greater approaches for bribes. This is consistent with the result of 
Hunt (2007) who suggests that a crime victim having reported the crime to the police comes in 
contact with potentially corrupt officials increasing her/his exposure to bribe demands. 
There are some interesting similarities and contrasts between the country effects on crime and 
bribery. The OLS results show that rising inequality reduces (overall) crime and bribery
14 but 
increases serious crime
15. The IV results presented below show however that rising inequality 
has a positive impact on bribery. A strengthening of the rule of law reduces both crime and 
corruption. Ceteris paribus, a happier
16 society sees less of both crime, especially serious crime, 
and corruption. The only previous evidence of a link between happiness and crime victimisation, 
that we are aware of, is that of Powdthavee (2005) who found on South African data that 
“victims report significantly lower well-being than the non-victims” and that “happiness is lower 
for non-victimized respondents currently living in higher crime areas”(p.531). Powdthavee 
(2005)’ s study ,which complements the present study, looks at the link running from crime( 
cause) to unhappiness  (effect) based on single country data while ours , based on cross country 
data, provides evidence on the link running from unhappiness (cause) to crime (effect).While 
rising unemployment has a strong positive effect on overall crime rates, but a negative effect on 
serious crime rates, it has no significant impact on corruption. Population size has a similar effect 
to that of unemployment in impacting positively on crime, negatively on serious crime and has 
no effect on corruption. Improvements in the human development indicator (HDI) lead, 
paradoxically, to a more crime prone but a less corrupt country. The time coefficients show that, 
                                                            
13 This effect may reflect the fact that the educated and high income earners are more likely to record and report 
crime and corruption victimisation than the others.    
14 See also Gupta, et. al. (2002) and Li, et. al. (2000) for evidence on the association between inequality and bribery. 
15 Note however that, as we report later, the effect of inequality on crime and bribery is sensitive to the relaxation of 
the exogeneity assumption and the use of IV. 
16 See Oswald (1997) and Frey and Stutzer (2000) for evidence on the association between the subjective measures 




once individual and country effects are controlled, there was a decrease in the serious crime 
rates. 
The probit estimates in Tables 1 are likely to suffer from bias if one or more of the country 
variables are correlated with variables that, also, influence the respondent’s answers to the 
questions on crime and bribe victimisation .The issue of sensitivity of the principal results to the 
relaxation of the OLS assumptions is examined by reporting the IV probits of crime, serious 
crime and bribe in Table 3.The country variables, regulatory burden, HDI and unemployment 
rate were treated as potentially endogenous and instrumented by Freedom of Press, Economic 
Freedom and Female/Male ratio which are all available at the country level. The Wald test easily 
rejects the assumption of exogeneity underlying the probit estimates of Table 1. A comparison of 
Tables 1 and 3 confirms, however, that, qualitatively, the effects of the individual characteristics 
on crime and corruption are fairly robust between the two sets of probit estimates. For example, 
residents of the larger towns and cities continue to report more crime and bribe victimisation, 
males report more bribe demands, females report more incidents of crime and serious crime 
victimisation. While with increasing age, individuals are less exposed to crime and bribe 
victimisation, with increasing education and income, individuals are more exposed to both types 
of victimisation. The earlier result that crime victims are more likely than non victims of crime to 
be approached for bribes holds in the presence of IV probit estimation as well.  
The country effects are less robust between the ordinary probit estimates reported in Table 1 and 
the IV probit estimates reported in Table 3. Rising unemployment increases both crime and 
bribery, while improvement in the human development indicator also leads, paradoxically, to an 
increase in both forms of victimisation. This latter, somewhat paradoxical, result may be 
explained by the fact that with an improvement in the human development indicator, residents 
are more likely to be forthcoming in reporting both crime and corruption. A strengthening of the 
legal institutions, as measured by the rule of law variable (rol), leads to a decline in crime and in 16 
 
bribery. A happier society sees less of both crime and bribery. These results, that establish the 
positive roles that the quality of legal system and happiness can play in reducing crime and 
corruption in society, acquire significance in view of their robustness between the probit and the 
IV probit estimates. Table 3 shows that rising inequality increases serious crimes and corruption. 
The IV estimates show that, once individual and country characteristics are controlled, there was 
a significant decline in crime and in bribery. This is consistent with the summary statistics 
presented and discussed in Section 3. The decline was particularly sharp in case of corruption 
followed by serious crime. 
In the spirit of this exercise that looks at the possible nexus between crime and corruption, we 
performed ordered probit estimation where the following outcomes, based on combinations of 
crime and bribe victimisation, were defined and ordered sequentially with a higher order 
denoting a superior outcome. 
(1) Respondent reports being a victim of both crime and bribery (i.e. Crime=1, Bribery=1).  
(2) Respondent reports either crime victimisation or bribe victimisation, but not both 
(Crime=1, Bribery=0, or Crime=0, Bribery=1). 
(3) Respondent denies being a victim of either crime or bribery (Crime=0, Bribe=0). 
Clearly the third outcome is the best, the first the worst, with (2) being the intermediate one. 
The ordered probit estimates (without and with the country effects) have been presented in Table 
4. Keeping in mind the possibility of non linearities in the relationship between inequality and 
crime/corruption, we allow both   linear and square terms in the inequality variable in the ordered 
probit regressions. If statistically significant, a positive sign of the estimated coefficient indicates 
a move towards a superior outcome, a negative sign otherwise, when the relevant characteristic 
increases by one unit. A comparison between the two halves of Table 4 confirms that the 
qualitative impact of the respondent’s individual characteristics to the combination of crime and 17 
 
bribe victimisation that she/he reports is robust to the introduction of the country indicators. 
Ceteris paribus, residents of smaller sized towns and cities, females, older adults, lower income 
earning individuals and less educated individuals are more likely report the superior outcome of 
no bribe and no crime victimisation. The country effects are also in line with the earlier results. 
For example, while stronger legal institutions, as measured by Rule of Law (rol) , and increasing 
happiness push the country towards a superior outcome, rising unemployment and an increase in 
the regulatory burden contribute to an inferior outcome. The inverse U shaped impact of 
inequality is interesting - initially, inequality pushes the country towards a superior outcome, but 
high inequality does the reverse. There are strong regional effects as well. Residents of countries 
in East Asia and the Pacific are better off than those in Europe and the Caribbean, while those in 
Latin America fare the worst. The Latin Americans are the most exposed to both crime and 
corruption victimisation. Consistent with the earlier evidence, as reported in the summary 
statistics and the probit regression estimates, the significantly positive estimate of the time trend 
confirms that over the period of this study, the world has moved towards the best outcome, i.e., 
has become a safer place from the viewpoint of both crimes and bribery. 
5.  Impact of Crime and Corruption on Growth 
This section shifts attention from the determinants of crime and corruption to their effects on a 
country’s growth rate. As we mentioned earlier, the resurgence of interest in the corruption 
literature was triggered by Mauro (1995)’s result that corruption impacts negatively on growth 
by reducing investment. This result has been found to lack robustness in subsequent studies, 
including Mauro’s own study on cross country data using the Business International (BI) Index 
of corruption
17. The present study revisits the issue by providing evidence on the association 
between growth and corruption using the country means from the ICVS data on corruption. We 
also extend the literature by providing evidence, where currently none exists, on the relation 
                                                            
17 Apart from the fact that the BI data is subjective and is based on perceptions, it is an ordinal measure though it has 
been treated as cardinal in most of the studies that are based on this data set. This is also true of studies that use the 
perceptions data from the Transparency International. 18 
 
between crime and growth rates and, further, on that between serious crime and growth rates. In 
common with the rest of the study, we provide evidence on robustness by presenting OLS and IV 
estimates of the regressions.  
The OLS, IV regression estimates of crime, serious crime and corruption, along with a selection 
of country level variables, on a country’s growth rate are presented in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively. In the IV estimations, we instrumented the principal determinants of interest, 
namely, crime, serious crime and bribery rates (and their squares) by a selection of variables that 
include economic freedom, freedom of press, government intervention, informal sector, 
government control of wages and prices, and happiness. Since the country level variables, that 
were collected from a variety of sources listed in the Appendix (Table A2)
18, were not available 
for all the countries in the ICVS data set, a significant consideration behind the choice of those to 
include in the regressions was their availability for as many countries as possible, so as to not 
lose too many observations. The IV estimates confirm the validity of the instruments. 
The OLS estimates presented in table 5 show that corruption does impact nonlinearly on growth 
rates with the coefficients of the linear corruption rate variable and the square of corruption rate 
variable recording statistical significances at 5% level of significance. The estimated magnitude 
of the coefficients of the linear and square terms show that at low levels, corruption impacts 
positively on growth, but as the corruption rate exceeds a threshold of around 16 %, it starts to 
impact negatively on growth. Table 6 shows, however, that the effect of corruption on growth 
weakens to insignificance on the use of IV estimation. In case of crime, neither crime rates nor 
serious crime rates have significant effects on growth rates and this result holds true in case of 
both OLS
19 and IV estimates .This lack of a strong association between crime and growth rates 
and between corruption and growth rates is consistent with the picture portrayed in Figure 14 and 
                                                            
18 See Appendix Table A2 for a full listing of all the variables (with their abbreviated names), along with the 
sources, used in this study. 
19 The OLS estimates show that serious crime has a marginally stronger negative impact on growth than does crime 
(overall) via the significance, at 10 % level of significance, of the square term in serious crime rate in Table 5. 19 
 
the weak correlation magnitudes reported there. The OLS estimates show that, ceteris paribus, 
the strengthening of legal institutions that is captured by the rule of law variable leads to an 
increase in the growth rate. This effect weakens somewhat in case of IV estimation.  
6.   Summary and Conclusions 
This paper uses a large cross country micro data set (ICVS) to compare the determinants of 
crime and bribe victimisation and their effects on economic growth. This data set contains 
information on both forms of victimisation in a range of countries that span a wide spectrum of 
economic and social indicators. The paper exploits a unique feature of the data set that the same 
individual was asked whether she/he was a crime and a bribe victim. The responses contained in 
the data set are accompanied by the individual characteristics of the respondent. The study uses 
the crime victim’s own subjective view to categorise the crime committed into “serious crime” 
and “non serious or light crime”. The study supplements the individual characteristics with 
country level information obtained from a variety of sources to examine the effect of individual 
characteristics and institutions in the respondent’s country of residence on the individual’s 
exposure to crime and corruption. This paper also contains evidence on the association between 
crime and corruption at both country level and at the level of individuals. A methodological 
novelty of this study is the ordered probit estimation where combinations of crime and bribe 
victimisation were used to define and order outcomes in a welfare improving ascending order. 
This study also examines the question whether crime impacts negatively on a country’s growth 
rate similar to the result on corruption that generated a large literature.   
The principal results include the evidence that suggests that while males are more vulnerable to 
bribe demands, females are more likely to be crime victims, especially of serious crime. The role 
of informal social networks in the smaller towns and cities in acting as protective mechanisms 
against crime and bribe victimisation explains the higher prevalence of both forms of 
victimisation in the more populated regions. A crime victim is more likely to be exposed to bribe 20 
 
demands than a non victim. Rising income and higher education levels increase the individual’s 
exposure to both crime and bribery. 
The paper contains evidence on the importance of institutions and country level indicators in 
explaining cross country differences in the individual’s exposure to both forms of victimisation. 
For example, the strengthening of the rule of law reduces the incidence of both crime and 
corruption. A happier country also sees less of both crime and corruption. The paper also 
contains evidence that rising unemployment and inequality lead to higher criminalisation and a 
more corrupt society. The last two results are not unrelated since, as Frey and Stutzer (2000) 
observe, “unemployment has a strongly depressing effect on happiness”
20. It is also important to 
recognise the lack of robustness of some of the country level determinants of crime and 
corruption between the OLS and IV regression results. The most prominent of these is the effect 
of inequality on crime and corruption. This may point to the need to allow for the mutual impact 
of corruption and inequality on one another, as You and Khagram (2005) suggest, but such an 
extension is beyond the scope of this study. Against such a background of non robustness of 
several country effects
21, the robust evidence on the positive role of rule of law and happiness in 
reducing both forms of victimisation is a result of considerable significance. The ordered probit 
estimates establish the robustness of the positive role that a strengthened legal system and a 
happier society play in improving outcomes.  
This study finds no strong evidence of any significant association either between crime and 
growth rates or between corruption and growth rates. While the former result is found to be 
robust to the treatment of endogeneity and the use of IV estimation, the OLS estimates provide 
limited evidence that suggests that corruption impacts nonlinearly on growth rates. At low levels, 
corruption has a positive effect on growth, but impacts negatively at higher levels of corruption. 
                                                            
20  See also Oswald (1997) for strong evidence of the negative association between unemployment and happiness or, 
as he says, “unemployed people are very unhappy”. 
21 The lack of robustness of several of the country effects possibly reflects the inferior quality of the country level 
indicators, especially the lack of a consistent time series of such information to coincide with the time period of the 
ICVS data sets, and the consequent problem of errors in variables that this entails.    21 
 
This evidence of a significant effect of corruption on growth rate disappears on the use of IV 
estimation. A by product of this exercise is the evidence on the positive role that the 
strengthening of legal institutions plays in increasing a country’s growth rate.  
This study was motivated by an attempt to bridge the gap between the parallel literatures on 
crime and corruption. While the evidence on the determinants of crime and corruption are of 
interest on their own, the focus of this study has been on a comparison between their magnitudes, 
determinants and effects on growth. The results of this study point to the importance of both 
individual characteristics and institutions in profiling an individual who is at a high risk from 
both crime and bribery.  
As we gain access to more data sets that contain information on crime and corruption, the recent 
convergence in the two empirical literatures will gather momentum. The results of this exercise 
suggest that examination of the link between crime and corruption and attempts to integrate 
studies of the two types of victimisation provide a fruitful area for further research. The 
estimates of the effect of unemployment and inequality on crime and corruption and their non 
robustness to the use of IV estimation seem to suggest a more complex relationship than we have 
considered in this study. The simultaneous estimation of crime, corruption, inequality and 
unemployment incorporating their mutual dependence is another fruitful area for further research 
that is indicated by the present results. 
A result that stands out because of its robustness is the role of rising happiness in reducing both 
crime and corruption in society. The present study suggests that it plays an analogous role to that 
of legal institutions in checking crime and corruption. In recent years, as the study by Frey and 
Stutzer (2000) illustrates, economists have been paying increasing attention to happiness and its 
determinants. Much of the literature on happiness, summarised in Oswald (1997), has been on its 
magnitude and determinants rather than on its consequences for outcomes such as crime and 
corruption. The present results suggest that we need to change focus from the former to the 22 
 
latter. To our knowledge there has not been any previous attempt to study the link between 
happiness, crime and corruption. While there is now an emerging literature on the link between 
crime and happiness [Powdthavee (2005)] and on the link between crime and corruption [Hunt 
(2007)], there has been no previous attempt to examine the link between crime, corruption and 
happiness in a unified framework 
.A greater exploration of the link between happiness (at both individual and country levels), 
institutions, crime and corruption provides another fertile ground for further research. For such a 
study to proceed, we need more and better quality data on institutions that are consistently 
available for a large number of countries over a long time period. Given the importance of 
institutions in explaining cross country differences in crime and corruption, as this study has 
demonstrated, the need to embark on a project to collect such information on an international 
scale comparable to the ICVS data sets that have been used here cannot be overstated.   
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Figures: 
Figure 1: Lowess Fit between Crime and Bribe Rates, 1991 - 2005 
 
 
Figure 2: Lowess Fit between Serious Crime and Bribe Rates, 1991 - 2005 
 




Figure 4: Lowess Fit between per capita GNP at PPP and Crime Rate, 1991 - 2005 
 
 




Figure 6: Lowess Fit between per capita GNP at PPP and Light Crime Rate, 1991 - 2005 
 
 




Figure 8: Lowess Fit between per capita GNP at PPP and Bribe Rate, 1991 - 2005 
 
 




Figure 10: Crime Rate Distributions − Kernel Densities for 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003 
 
variable  N  mean  max  min  sd  variance median skewness kurtosis
crime rate 91  29 0.711  1.000  0.409  0.163 0.026 0.649 0.440  2.174 
crime rate 95  44 0.679  0.946  0.336  0.123 0.015 0.663 -0.119 3.335 
crime rate 99  46 0.665  1.000  0.316  0.166 0.028 0.696 -0.017 2.217 












Figure 11: Serious Crime Rate Distributions − Kernel Densities for 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003 32 
 
 
variable N mean  max  min sd  variance median  skewness  kurtosis
SCR91  29  0.596 0.990 0.332 0.186 0.035 0.545 0.550 2.167 
SCR95  44  0.573 0.876 0.267 0.151 0.023 0.566 0.101 2.353 
SCR99  46  0.549 0.925 0.233 0.176 0.031 0.561 0.069 1.848 












Figure 12: Light Crime Rate Distributions − Kernel Densities for 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003 33 
 
 
variable N mean  max  min sd  variance median  skewness  kurtosis
LCR91  29  0.115 0.256 0.005 0.066 0.004 0.119 0.187 2.461 
LCR95  44  0.106 0.222 0.037 0.047 0.002 0.096 0.703 2.759 
LCR99  46  0.116 0.516 0.000 0.082 0.007 0.100 2.643  13.347 












Figure 13: Bribe Rate Distributions − Kernel Densities for 1995, 1999 and 2003 34 
 
 
variable  N  mean  max  min  sd  variance median skewness kurtosis
bribe rate 95  44  0.107 0.302 0.001 0.090  0.008  0.102  0.567  2.360 
bribe rate 99  44  0.105 0.591 0.000 0.118  0.014  0.072  1.823  7.714 













Figure 14: Lowess Fit between Growth and Bribe Rates, and between Growth and Crime Rates, 







Table 1: Probit Coefficient Estimates of Crime and Corruption, 1991-2005 
Variables
b  Crime
a Serious  Crime
a Bribe  or  Corruption
a 
Coefficient
c Robust  SE z  P>|z|  Coefficient
c Robust  SE  z  P>|z|  Coefficient
c Robust  SE  z  P>|z| 
smalltown -0.270*  0.015  -18.06 0.000  -0.161*  0.021 -7.85  0.000  -0.255*  0.030 -8.52  0.000 
medtown  -0.067* 0.016  -4.14  0.000 -0.034  0.022 -1.5  0.134  -0.196*  0.028  -6.96  0.000 
male -0.021***  0.011  -1.87  0.061  -0.160*  0.015 -10.45  0.000  0.318*  0.021 15.37 0.000 
age35to60 -0.140*  0.014  -9.67  0.000  0.024  0.019 1.27  0.205  -0.172*  0.024 -7.24  0.000 
ageabove60 -0.452*  0.022  -20.32 0.000  -0.086*  0.031 -2.76  0.006  -0.455*  0.048 -9.43  0.000 
married -0.043*  0.012  -3.59  0.000  -0.064*  0.017 -3.83  0.000  0.066*  0.023 2.83 0.005 
working -0.121*  0.037  -3.26  0.001  0.019  0.042 0.45  0.653  0.116**  0.057 2.03  0.042 
lookwork  -0.220* 0.041  -5.33  0.000 -0.001  0.048 -0.03  0.979  0.071  0.063 1.12 0.263 
homekeeper  -0.280* 0.041  -6.79  0.000 -0.018  0.050 -0.35  0.726  0.100  0.069 1.45 0.148 
retired -0.270*  0.040  -6.73  0.000  0.022  0.047 0.46  0.642  -0.121***  0.069 -1.76  0.079 
at school  -0.251*  0.047  -5.31  0.000  -0.099*** 0.055  -1.79  0.073  0.027  0.067  0.4  0.690 
upperincome 0.146*  0.012  12.23  0.000 -0.040**  0.016  -2.51  0.012 0.095*  0.021  4.52  0.000 
education years  0.034*  0.002  18.07  0.000  0.012* 0.002  5.42  0.000  0.027* 0.003  10.16  0.000 
crime  0.513* 0.027  18.94  0.000 
t 0.033**  0.016  2.11  0.035  -0.395*  0.021  -18.64 0.000  0.085*  0.022  3.86  0.000 
hdi 3.891*  0.420  9.26  0.000  1.766*  0.602  2.93 0.003  -4.616*  0.667 -6.92 0.000 
rol -0.327*  0.027  -12.06 0.000  0.060  0.039 1.54  0.123  -0.319*  0.040 -7.92  0.000 
reg1000 0.871*  0.133  6.56  0.000  0.532**  0.214  2.48 0.013  -1.844*  0.187 -9.85 0.000 
unemployment 0.043*  0.002  27.24  0.000  -0.037*  0.002 -18.42  0.000  -0.002  0.002  -0.76 0.447 
inequality -0.005*  0.002  -2.87  0.004  0.016*  0.003 5.92  0.000  -0.030*  0.003 -9.2 0.000 
happy_ls10 -0.006  0.016  -0.4  0.686  -0.250*  0.019 -12.82  0.000  -0.251*  0.019 -13.47 0.000 
lpop 0.035*  0.007  4.69  0.000  -0.089*  0.010 -8.5  0.000  -0.006  0.012 -0.5  0.619 
Deap  -0.779* 0.056  -13.91 0.000 -0.124  0.081 -1.54  0.124  0.484*  0.092 5.27 0.000 
Deuca 0.103*  0.025  4.07  0.000  -0.033  0.037 -0.89  0.376  0.063  0.075 0.84 0.398 
Dla 0.662*  0.057  11.69  0.000  0.510*  0.071 7.15  0.000  1.183*  0.077  15.35  0.000 
constant -2.456*  0.282  -8.71  0.000  2.593*  0.403 6.43  0.000  5.598*  0.422  13.27  0.000 
No. of obs     60021  36356  60003 
Log Pseudolikelihood -36371.657 -19009.657  -9576.0755 
Pseudo R
2 0.0964  0.0937  0.2225 
a. Equals to 1 if a victim, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A2 for meaning of the variable names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 37 
 
Table 2: Marginal Effects of Individual, Country and Institutional Characteristics on Crime and Corruption, 1991-2005 
 
Variables
b     Crime
a Serious  Crime
a Bribe  or  Corruption
a 
   dy/dx  Std Error  z  P>|z|  dy/dx  Std Error  z  P>|z|  dy/dx  Std Error  z  P>|z| 
smalltown # -0.103*  0.006  -18.08  0.000 -0.051* 0.007 -7.77  0.000  -0.011* 0.001 -8.47  0.000 
medtown #  -0.026*  0.006  -4.12  0.000  -0.011  0.007 -1.49  0.136  -0.008* 0.001 -7.43  0.000 
male #  -0.008***  0.004  -1.87  0.062  -0.050*  0.005 -10.4  0.000  0.015*  0.001 14.26  0.000 
age35to60 # -0.053*  0.006  -9.67  0.000  0.007  0.006 1.27  0.204  -0.007* 0.001 -7.21  0.000 
ageabove60 #  -0.176*  0.009  -20.23 0.000  -0.027*  0.010 -2.71  0.007  -0.016* 0.001 -11.61  0.000 
married #  -0.017* 0.005 -3.6  0.000  -0.020* 0.005 -3.84  0.000  0.003*  0.001  2.85  0.004 
working #  -0.046* 0.014 -3.27  0.001  0.006  0.013 0.45  0.653  0.005** 0.003 2.03  0.042 
lookwork #  -0.086*  0.016  -5.25  0.000 0.000  0.015 -0.03  0.979  0.003  0.003  1.05  0.293 
homekeeper #  -0.109*  0.016  -6.69  0.000  -0.006 0.016  -0.35  0.727  0.005 0.004 1.33  0.184 
retired #  -0.104*  0.016  -6.67  0.000  0.007 0.015 0.47  0.641  -0.005***  0.003 -1.86  0.063 
at school  #  -0.098*  0.019  -5.22  0.000  -0.032*** 0.018  -1.74  0.081  0.001  0.003  0.39  0.697 
upperincome #  0.055*  0.005  12.3  0.000 -0.013**  0.005  -2.51 0.012 0.004*  0.001  4.45 0.000 
education years  0.013*  0.001  18.1  0.000  0.004*  0.001 5.42  0.000  0.001* 0.000 9.95  0.000 
crime #  0.021* 0.001  20.64  0.000 
t 0.013**  0.006  2.11  0.035  -0.124*  0.007 -18.8  0.000  0.004*  0.001  3.87  0.000 
hdi  1.483* 0.160 9.26  0.000  0.552* 0.188 2.94 0.003 -0.202*  0.029  -6.96 0.000 
rol -0.125*  0.010  -12.06  0.000  0.019  0.012 1.54  0.123  -0.014* 0.002 -7.73  0.000 
reg1000 0.332*  0.051  6.56  0.000  0.166**  0.067  2.48 0.013 -0.081*  0.008  -9.71 0.000 
unemployment 0.016*  0.001  27.25  0.000  -0.012*  0.001 -18.5  0.000  0.000  0.000 -0.76  0.447 
inequality -0.002*  0.001  -2.87  0.004  0.005*  0.001 5.93  0.000  -0.001* 0.000 -9.01  0.000 
happy_ls10 -0.002  0.006  -0.4  0.686  -0.078*  0.006 -12.88  0.000  -0.011*  0.001 -12.79  0.000 
lpop 0.013*  0.003  4.69  0.000  -0.028*  0.003 -8.49  0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.5  0.619 
Deap #  -0.303*  0.020  -14.89  0.000  -0.040  0.027 -1.48  0.138  0.033*  0.009  3.66  0.000 
Deuca #  0.040*  0.010  4.04  0.000  -0.010  0.011 -0.89  0.372  0.003  0.003  0.89  0.376 
Dla  #  0.218* 0.015  14.58  0.000  0.133* 0.015 8.98  0.000  0.149* 0.018 8.27  0.000 
a. Equals to 1 if a victim, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A2 for meaning of the variable names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. (#) dy/dx is for discrete 





Table 3: IV-Probit Coefficient Estimates of Crime and Corruption, 1991-2005 
   Crime
a Serious  Crime




c Robust SE  z  P>|z|  Coefficient
c Robust  SE z  P>|z| Coefficient
c Robust SE z  P>|z| 
reg1000 -1.205*  0.414  -2.91  0.004  1.877*  0.612 3.07  0.002 3.387*  0.828  4.09  0.000 
hdi 14.895*  3.560  4.18  0.000  12.889*  3.784 3.41  0.001  60.468*  7.581  7.98  0.000 
unemployment 0.042*  0.015  2.76  0.006  0.019  0.019 1.04  0.299 0.280*  0.032  8.84  0.000 
smalltown -0.301*  0.017  -17.37 0.000  -0.211*  0.026 -8.13  0.000 -0.434*  0.038  -11.34 0.000 
medtown -0.110*  0.019  -5.81  0.000  -0.068*  0.025 -2.73  0.006 -0.368*  0.038 -9.7  0.000 
male -0.028**  0.012  -2.4  0.016  -0.163*  0.016 -10.41 0.000  0.280*  0.024 11.67 0.000 
age35to60 -0.148*  0.015  -9.91  0.000  0.036***  0.019 1.84  0.066  -0.126*  0.028  -4.53  0.000 
ageabove60 -0.490*  0.023  -21.58 0.000  -0.072**  0.032 -2.23  0.026 -0.472*  0.053  -8.83  0.000 
married -0.041*  0.013  -3.2  0.001  -0.076*  0.017 -4.37  0.000 -0.009  0.027  -0.33  0.738 
working -0.151*  0.039  -3.83  0.000  0.042  0.044 0.97  0.332 0.214*  0.067  3.19  0.001 
lookwork -0.216*  0.043  -5  0.000  -0.021  0.050 -0.43  0.669  0.044  0.074 0.59  0.553 
homekeeper -0.328*  0.043  -7.63  0.000  -0.004  0.052 -0.07  0.942  0.108  0.079 1.37  0.170 
retired -0.257*  0.043  -5.95  0.000  0.051  0.050 1.03  0.303 0.066  0.081  0.82  0.412 
at school  -0.255*  0.049  -5.25  0.000  -0.090  0.056 -1.61  0.107  0.001  0.080 0.01  0.992 
upperincome 0.173*  0.017  10.23 0.000  0.000  0.021  0  0.997 0.328*  0.036  9.09  0.000 
education years  0.030*  0.002  16.87  0.000  0.010* 0.002  3.98  0.000  0.018*  0.003  5.17  0.000 
crime  0.245* 0.041  5.93  0.000 
t -0.277**  0.122  -2.27  0.023  -0.819*  0.142 -5.78  0.000 -2.128*  0.256  -8.32  0.000 
rol -0.954*  0.115  -8.3  0.000  -0.285**  0.126 -2.26  0.024 -2.445*  0.246  -9.96  0.000 
inequality -0.004  0.005  -0.87  0.384  0.033*  0.007 4.79  0.000 0.044*  0.010  4.26  0.000 
happy_ls10 -0.294*  0.039  -7.44  0.000  -0.286*  0.028 -10.3  0.000 -0.912*  0.082  -11.08 0.000 
lpop 0.075*  0.011  7  0.000  -0.126*  0.019  -6.8 0.000 -0.034***  0.018  -1.94  0.052 
Deap 0.336***  0.186  1.81  0.070  0.293***  0.163 1.8  0.072  3.469*  0.366  9.47  0.000 
Deuca 0.112*  0.026  4.28  0.000 -0.003  0.039  -0.06  0.948  -0.062  0.084  -0.74  0.460 
Dla 0.993*  0.067  14.82  0.000  0.341*  0.096 3.54  0.000 1.415*  0.100  14.15 0.000 
constant -6.942*  2.364  -2.94  0.003  -5.079***  2.606 -1.95  0.051  -37.381*  5.044  -7.41  0.000 
No. of obs     60021  36356  60003 
Wald test of significance: χ
2 (24)  6485.65 3059.43 2852.68 
Prob > χ
2 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Wald test of exogeneity: χ
2 (3)  332.68  10.89  117.77 
Prob > χ
2 0.0000* 0.0124** 0.0000* 
a. Equals to 1 if a victim, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A2 for meaning of the variable names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 39 
 
Table 4: Ordered
a Probit Coefficient Estimates of Crime and Corruption, 1991-2005 
Variables
b  Without Country Effects  With Country Effects 
Coefficient
c Robust  SE  z  P>|z|  Coefficient
c Robust  SE z  P>|z| 
smalltown 0.348*  0.007  49.35  0.000 0.279* 0.014  20.34  0.000 
medtown 0.091*  0.008  11.1  0.000 0.107* 0.015  7.31  0.000 
male -0.045*  0.006  -7  0.000  -0.054*  0.010  -5.15  0.000 
age35to60 0.182*  0.008  23.29  0.000 0.150* 0.013  11.45  0.000 
ageabove60 0.522*  0.012  42.3  0.000 0.456* 0.021  22.16  0.000 
married 0.008  0.007  1.18  0.239 0.018 0.011  1.61  0.107 
working 0.259*  0.020  12.85  0.000 0.024 0.030  0.81  0.420 
lookwork 0.203*  0.023  8.73  0.000 0.118* 0.034  3.45  0.001 
homekeepr 0.358*  0.022  16.21  0.000 0.161* 0.035  4.66  0.000 
retired 0.352*  0.022  15.88  0.000 0.195* 0.033  5.89  0.000 
at school  0.081*  0.027  3.04  0.002 0.140* 0.040  3.55  0.000 
upperincome -0.175*  0.007  -26.46  0.000 -0.134* 0.011  -12.2  0.000 
education years  -0.020*  0.001  -22.6  0.000 -0.034* 0.002  -20.51  0.000 
t 0.128*  0.004  33.82  0.000  0.032** 0.014  2.27  0.023 
hdi  -4.932* 0.432  -11.43  0.000 
rol  0.386* 0.026  14.59  0.000 
reg1000  -0.647* 0.129  -5.01  0.000 
unemployment  -0.035* 0.001  -23.55  0.000 
inequality  0.061* 0.008  7.59  0.000 
inequality squared  -0.001* 0.000  -7.12  0.000 
happy_ls10  0.102* 0.015  6.98  0.000 
lpop  -0.030* 0.007  -4.14  0.000 
Deap  0.552* 0.054  10.24  0.000 
Deuca  -0.158* 0.024  -6.54  0.000 
Dla  -0.710* 0.050  -14.24  0.000 
constant 2.100*  0.006  329.10  0.000 2.236* 0.011  205.69  0.000 
No. of obs     153862 60003 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -120111.05  -44799.57 
Pseudo R
2  0.0563 0.1006 
a. Order = 0, if crime = bribe=1; Order = 1 if crime=1, bribe=0 OR crime=0, bribe=1; Order = 2 if crime = bribe = 0. b. See Appendix Table A2 for meaning of the variable names. c. *, ** and 
*** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 40 
 
Table 5: OLS Coefficient Estimates of Growth Rates 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate  Dependent Variable: Growth Rate  Dependent Variable: Growth Rate 
Variables
a Coefficient
b  Robust SE  t  P>|t|   Variables
a Coefficient
b  Robust SE t  P>|t|   Variables
a Coefficient
b Robust t  P>|t| 
 crime rate  0.539  0.457  1.18  0.242  SCR
c 0.603  0.386  1.56  0.122   bribe rate  1.340**  0.555  2.41  0.018
 crime rate square -0.478  0.334  -1.43 0.156  SCR square  -0.658***  0.347  -1.89  0.062  bribe rate square  -4.110**  1.688  -2.43 0.017
 hdi  -0.122  0.333  -0.37 0.715  hdi  -0.239  0.335 -0.71  0.478   hdi  -0.055  0.314  -0.18 0.861
 lpop  -0.011  0.008  -1.39 0.167  lpop  -0.011  0.008 -1.42  0.160   lpop  -0.005  0.008  -0.61 0.544
 inflation  0.000  0.000  -0.92 0.358  inflation  0.000  0.000 -0.62  0.535   inflation  0.000  0.000  -1.42 0.159
 rol  0.028  0.024  1.15  0.255  rol  0.030  0.025 1.21  0.230   rol  0.070** 0.030  2.34  0.022
 reg1000  -0.010  0.012  -0.81 0.421  reg1000  -0.013  0.012 -1.09  0.278   reg1000  0.003  0.013  0.21  0.831
 Dla  -0.014  0.037  -0.38 0.702  Dla  -0.001  0.039 -0.03  0.978   Dla  -0.012  0.037  -0.32 0.750
 t  0.006  0.014  0.44  0.660  t  0.005  0.014 0.36  0.721   t  0.006  0.013  0.48  0.636
 lgnp1995  -0.025  0.044  -0.58 0.560  lgnp1995  -0.019  0.043 -0.45  0.657   lgnp1995  -0.028  0.042  -0.67 0.508
 constant  0.308  0.249  1.24  0.220  constant  0.357  0.228 1.56  0.122   constant 0.062  0.227  0.27  0.786
No. of obs     98   No. of obs     98   No. of obs     95 
F(10,84)  1.58   F(10,87)  1.67   F(10,84)  1.64 
Prob > F  0.126  Prob > F  0.101  Prob > F  0.110
R
2 0.154   R
2 0.161   R
2 0.163
Adjusted R
2  0.057  Adjusted R
2  0.064  Adjusted R
2 0.063
Root MSE  0.093  Root MSE  0.093  Root MSE  0.092




Table 6: IV Coefficient Estimates
 d, e of Growth Rates 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate  Dependent Variable: Growth Rate  Dependent Variable: Growth Rate 
Variables
a Coefficient
b Robust SE  z  P>|z|   Variables
a Coefficient
b Robust SE  z  P>|z|  Variables
a Coefficient
b Robust z  P>|z| 
crime rate  0.707  1.325  0.53  0.594   SCR
c 1.208  1.034  1.17  0.243    bribe rate  1.093 1.044  1.05  0.295 
crime rate square -0.656  0.994  -0.66  0.509   SCR square  -1.224  0.914  -1.34  0.181   bribe rate square  -3.978 2.772  -1.44  0.151 
hdi -0.271  0.533  -0.51  0.612    hdi  -0.297  0.472 -0.63  0.530    hdi  -0.331 0.412 -0.8  0.422 
lpop -0.015  0.011  -1.36  0.173    lpop  -0.014  0.009 -1.52  0.128    lpop  -0.012 0.009  -1.36 0.174 
inflation 0.000  0.000  -0.53  0.598    inflation  0.000  0.000 -0.18  0.857    inflation  0.000 0.000  -1.14 0.256 
rol 0.029  0.028  1.05  0.294    rol  0.044  0.033 1.32  0.185    rol  0.067 0.042  1.59 0.111 
reg1000 -0.013  0.015  -0.84  0.402    reg1000  -0.016  0.016 -0.95  0.342    reg1000  0.003  0.015 0.21 0.837 
Dla 0.031  0.044  0.7  0.485      Dla  0.051  0.046 1.09  0.275    Dla  0.036 0.044  0.81 0.416 
t 0.012  0.015  0.79  0.431    t  0.009  0.015 0.6  0.548    t  0.015 0.014  1.12  0.263 
lgnp1995 -0.012  0.067  -0.17  0.864    lgnp1995  -0.019  0.057 -0.34  0.736    lgnp1995  -0.008 0.042  -0.18 0.854 
constant 0.314  0.511  0.61  0.539    constant 0.241  0.418  0.58  0.564   constant  0.238 0.428  0.56  0.577 
No. of obs    80  No. of obs       80  No. of obs     79 
Anderson stats: χ
2 (5)  11.26**  0.046  Anderson LM Stats: χ
2 (5)  12.15**  0.033  Anderson LM Stats: χ
2 (5) 13.77**  0.017 
Sargan Stats: χ
2 (4)  2.45  0.654  Sargan  Stats:  χ
2  1.22  0.874  Sargan  Stats:  χ
2 (4)  2.07  0.723 
a. See Appendix Table A2 for meaning of the variable names. b. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. c. SCR = Serious Crime Rate. d. Instruments: 




Table A1: Average Crime and Bribe (Corruption) Rates by Country 












Bribe to Crime 
Ratio (g) 
Albania 1995  0.128  0.538  0.374 0.163 0.696 0.304  0.237 
Albania 1999  0.591  0.83  0.718 0.112 0.865 0.135  0.712 
Argentina 1991  NA  0.91  0.781 0.129 0.858 0.142  NA 
Argentina 1995  0.302  0.946  0.876 0.07 0.926  0.074 0.319 
Argentina 1999  0.053  0.468  0.436 0.032 0.932 0.068  0.114 
Argentina 2003  0.054  0.472  0.432 0.04 0.914  0.086 0.114 
Australia 1991  NA  0.619  0.461 0.159 0.744 0.256  NA 
Australia 1999  0.002  0.668  0.489 0.179 0.732 0.268  0.004 
Australia 2003  NA  1  0.665  0.335 0.665 0.335  NA 
Austria 1995  0.007  0.459  0.311 0.149 0.676 0.324  0.014 
Austria 2003  0.005  0.485  0.352 0.133 0.725 0.275  0.01 
Azerbaijan 1999  0.204  0.499  0.474 0.025  0.95  0.05  0.409 
Belarus 1995  0.131  0.696  0.609 0.087 0.875 0.125  0.188 
Belarus 1999  0.195  0.755  0.67  0.084 0.888 0.112  0.258 
Belgium 1991  NA  0.513  0.38  0.133 0.741 0.259  NA 
Belgium 1999  0.003  0.563  0.383 0.18 0.681  0.319 0.006 
Belgium 2003  0.007  0.555  0.41  0.144 0.739 0.261  0.013 
Bolivia  1995  0.244  0.783  0.695 0.088 0.887 0.113  0.312 
Botswana 1995  0.028  0.583  0.53  0.053 0.909 0.091  0.048 
Botswana 1999  0.008  0.733  0.668 0.065 0.911 0.089  0.011 
Brazil 1991  NA  0.731  0.636  0.095 0.87  0.13  NA 
Brazil 1995  0.171  0.631  0.549  0.082 0.87  0.13  0.271 
Brazil 1999  NA  1  0.925  0.075 0.925 0.075  NA 
Bulgaria 1995  0.178  0.867  0.808 0.059 0.931 0.069  0.206 
Bulgaria 1999  0.162  0.716  0.635 0.082 0.886 0.114  0.226 
Bulgaria 2003  0.071  0.46  0.367 0.094 0.797 0.203  0.154 45 
 
Table A1: Continued 












Bribe to Crime 
Ratio (g) 
Cambodia 1999  0.215  0.721  0.663 0.058 0.919 0.081  0.298 
Canada 1991  NA  0.592  0.426 0.165  0.72  0.28  NA 
Canada 1995  0.004  0.599  0.439 0.16 0.733  0.267 0.006 
Canada 1999  0.004  0.546  0.38  0.166 0.696 0.304  0.007 
Canada 2003  0.005  0.499  0.345 0.154 0.692 0.308  0.01 
China 1991  NA  0.594  0.419  0.175 0.706 0.294  NA 
Colombia 1995  0.195  0.908  0.838 0.07 0.923  0.077 0.215 
Colombia 1999  0.172  0.9  0.824 0.076 0.916 0.084  0.191 
Costa Rica  1991  NA  0.609  0.503 0.106 0.826 0.174  NA 
Costa Rica  1995  0.092  0.745  0.625 0.12 0.839  0.161 0.123 
Croatia 1995  0.147  0.641  0.573 0.067 0.895 0.105  0.229 
Croatia 1999  0.093  0.593  0.523 0.069 0.883 0.117  0.157 
Czech Rep  1991  NA  0.808  0.713 0.096 0.882 0.118  NA 
Czech  Rep 1995  0.085  0.772  0.66  0.112 0.855 0.145  0.11 
Czech  Rep 1999  0.081  0.823  0.623 0.199 0.758 0.242  0.098 
Denmark 1999  0.003  0.569  0.32  0.249 0.563 0.437  0.006 
Denmark 2003  0.007  0.597  0.338 0.26 0.565  0.435 0.011 
Egypt 1991  NA  0.852  0.809  0.043 0.949 0.051  NA 
Estonia 1991  NA  0.686  0.556 0.13 0.811  0.189  NA 
Estonia 1995  0.036  0.649  0.544 0.105 0.838 0.162  0.055 
Estonia  1999  0.051  0.376  0.376  0 1 0  0.136 
Estonia 2003  0.031  0.261  0.257 0.004 0.986 0.014  0.12 
Finland 1991  NA  1  0.744  0.256 0.744 0.256  NA 
Finland 1995  0.001  0.515  0.355 0.159 0.691 0.309  0.003 
Finland 1999  0.002  0.519  0.292 0.227 0.562 0.438  0.003 
Finland  2003  0  0.385  0.214 0.171 0.556 0.444  0.001 
France 1995  0.007  0.632  0.443  0.189  0.7  0.3  0.011 
France  1999  0.013  0.553  0.386 0.167 0.698 0.302  0.024 46 
 
Table A1: Continued 












Bribe to Crime 
Ratio (g) 
France  2003  0.01  0.507  0.368 0.139 0.726 0.274  0.02 
Georgia 1991  NA  0.838  0.804 0.034  0.96  0.04  NA 
Georgia 1995  0.212  0.718  0.652 0.066 0.908 0.092  0.295 
Georgia 1999  0.168  0.751  0.691  0.06 0.92 0.08 0.224 
Germany 2003  0.005  0.518  0.4 0.118 0.772 0.228  0.01 
Greece  2003  0.118  0.589  0.514 0.075 0.873 0.127  0.2 
Hong  Kong  2003  0  0.43  0.345 0.085 0.803 0.197  0 
Hungary 1995  0.033  0.666  0.57  0.095 0.857 0.143  0.05 
Hungary 1999  0.087  0.722  0.619 0.103 0.857 0.143  0.12 
Hungary 2003  0.054  0.56  0.45 0.11  0.803  0.197 0.096 
Iceland  2003  0.003  0.553  0.377 0.176 0.681 0.319  0.006 
India 1991  NA  0.529  0.516  0.013 0.976 0.024  NA 
India 1995  0.229  0.768  0.676  0.093 0.88  0.12  0.298 
Indonesia 1991  NA  0.409  0.363 0.046 0.888 0.112  NA 
Indonesia 1995  0.301  0.634  0.509 0.125 0.803 0.197  0.475 
Ireland 2003  0.002  0.525  0.383 0.142  0.73  0.27  0.004 
Italy 1991  NA  0.586  0.47  0.116 0.802 0.198  NA 
Italy 2003  0.006  0.506  0.405 0.1 0.802  0.198 0.012 
Japan 1999  0  0.423  0.29  0.133 0.687 0.313  0.001 
Japan 2003  0.002  0.377  0.247  0.13 0.655  0.345 0.005 
Kyrgyz Rep  1995  0.193  0.889  0.846 0.043 0.952 0.048  0.217 
Latvia 1995  0.126  0.661  0.566 0.095 0.856 0.144  0.191 
Latvia 1999  0.136  0.685  0.599 0.087 0.874 0.126  0.198 
Lesotho 1999  0.192  0.733  0.684 0.049 0.934 0.066  0.262 
Lithuania 1995  0.113  0.67  0.56  0.111 0.835 0.165  0.168 
Lithuania 1999  0.225  0.802  0.685 0.117 0.854 0.146  0.28 
Lithuania 2003  0.115  0.603  0.498 0.105 0.827 0.173  0.191 
Luxembourg 2003  0.004  0.514  0.426 0.088  0.83  0.17  0.007 47 
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Macedonia 1995  0.074  0.627  0.527 0.1 0.841  0.159 0.118 
Malta 1995  0.036  0.644  0.547  0.097 0.849 0.151  0.056 
Mexico 2003  0.121  0.473  0.375 0.098 0.793 0.207  0.257 
Mongolia 1995  0.046  0.729  0.567 0.163 0.777 0.223  0.063 
Mongolia 1999  0.198  0.815  0.677 0.138 0.831 0.169  0.243 
Mozambique 1999  0.305  0.878  0.762 0.116 0.868 0.132  0.347 
Namibia 1999  0.055  0.791  0.736 0.055 0.931 0.069  0.069 
Netherlands 1991  NA  0.649 0.425 0.224 0.655 0.345  NA 
Netherlands 1995  0.004  0.655 0.433 0.222 0.661 0.339  0.007 
Netherlands 1999  0.004  0.61 0.382 0.228 0.626 0.374  0.006 
Netherlands 2003  0.002  0.626 0.433 0.193 0.692 0.308  0.004 
New Zealand  1991  NA  0.627  0.471 0.156 0.752 0.248  NA 
New Zealand  2003  0.004  0.57  0.432 0.138 0.759 0.241  0.007 
Nigeria 1995  0.298  0.656  0.541 0.116 0.824 0.176  0.455 
Norway 2003  0.004  0.525  0.34  0.184 0.648 0.352  0.008 
Panama 1999  0.105  0.557  0.468 0.089 0.841 0.159  0.189 
Paraguay 1995  0.133  0.722  0.63  0.092 0.873 0.127  0.184 
Peru 2003  0.127  0.736  0.602  0.134 0.818 0.182  0.172 
Philippines 1991  NA  0.598  0.452 0.146 0.756 0.244  NA 
Philippines 1995  0.043  0.336  0.267 0.069 0.794 0.206  0.127 
Philippines 1999  0.036  0.316  0.233 0.083 0.738 0.262  0.114 
Poland 1991  0.051  0.599  0.454  0.146 0.757 0.243  0.085 
Poland 1995  0.043  0.498  0.385  0.114 0.772 0.228  0.086 
Poland 1999  0.064  0.53  0.426  0.105 0.802 0.198  0.121 
Poland  2003  0.043  1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.043 
Portugal 1999  0.012  0.391  0.295 0.097 0.753 0.247  0.031 
Portugal 2003  0.011  0.393  0.299 0.094 0.761 0.239  0.029 
Romania 1995  0.114  0.696  0.63  0.066 0.905 0.095  0.163 48 
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Romania 1999  0.174  0.707  0.657 0.05 0.929  0.071 0.246 
Russia 1991  NA  0.81  0.691  0.119 0.853 0.147  NA 
Russia 1995  0.18  0.78  0.667  0.113 0.855 0.145  0.23 
Russia 1999  0.167  0.777  0.657  0.121 0.845 0.155  0.215 
Slovak Rep  1991  NA  0.698  0.633 0.065 0.907 0.093  NA 
Slovak Rep  1995  0.135  0.773  0.736 0.037 0.952 0.048  0.174 
Slovenia 1991  NA  0.709  0.623 0.085 0.879 0.121  NA 
Slovenia 1995  0.014  0.597  0.485 0.112 0.812 0.188  0.023 
Slovenia 1999  0.021  0.517  0.424 0.093  0.82  0.18  0.041 
South Africa  1991  NA  0.61  0.545 0.066 0.892 0.108  NA 
South Africa  1995  0.069  0.692  0.621 0.071 0.898 0.102  0.099 
South Africa  1999  0.029  0.804  0.754 0.049 0.939 0.061  0.036 
South Africa  2003  0.155  0.664  0.588 0.077 0.885 0.115  0.233 
Spain 1991  NA  1  0.859  0.141 0.859 0.141  NA 
Spain 1999  0.002  0.497  0.385  0.112 0.775 0.225  0.005 
Spain 2003  0.004  0.516  0.399  0.117 0.773 0.227  0.008 
Swaziland 1999  0.173  0.835  0.777 0.058 0.931 0.069  0.207 
Sweden 1991  NA  0.57  0.332 0.238 0.583 0.417  NA 
Sweden  1995  0.002  0.576  0.395 0.181 0.686 0.314  0.003 
Sweden  1999  0.001  0.593  0.437 0.155 0.738 0.262  0.002 
Sweden  2003  0.003  0.566  0.411 0.155 0.726 0.274  0.006 
Switzerland 1995  0.005  0.615  0.4 0.215  0.65 0.35 0.008 
Switzerland 1999  NA 1  0.484 0.516 0.484 0.516  NA 
Switzerland 2003  0.006  0.316 0.21  0.106 0.665 0.335  0.02 
Tanzania 1991  NA  0.995  0.99  0.005 0.995 0.005  NA 
Tunisia 1991  NA  0.883  0.817 0.065 0.926 0.074  NA 
Turkey  2003  0.068  0.511  0.415 0.097 0.811 0.189  0.134 
Uganda 1991  NA  0.976  0.966  0.01 0.99 0.01  NA 49 
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Uganda 1995  0.195  0.789  0.749 0.04 0.949  0.051 0.248 
Uganda 1999  0.347  0.85  0.772 0.078 0.908 0.092  0.408 
UK 1991  NA  0.634  0.45  0.184 0.71  0.29  NA 
UK 1995  0.002  0.569  0.392  0.177 0.689 0.311  0.004 
UK 1999  0.001  0.511  0.364  0.147 0.713 0.287  0.001 
UK 2003  0.002  0.513  0.403  0.11 0.786  0.214 0.003 
Ukraine 1995  0.112  0.842  0.792 0.05 0.941  0.059 0.133 
Ukraine 1999  0.147  0.751  0.647 0.103 0.862 0.138  0.196 
USA  1995  0.002  0.557  0.415 0.143 0.744 0.256  0.004 
USA  1999  0.002  0.494  0.353 0.141 0.715 0.285  0.004 
USA  2003  0.003  0.471  0.363 0.109 0.769 0.231  0.007 
Yugoslavia 1995  0.173  0.84 0.782 0.059  0.93  0.07  0.206 
Zambia 1999  0.098  0.862  0.807 0.055 0.936 0.064  0.114 
Zimbabwe 1995  0.068  0.718  0.632 0.085 0.881 0.119  0.094 
Notes: 
(a) 
s respondent   of   No.   Total
 victims bribe   of   No.
  Rate   Bribe =   (e) 
Victims Crime   of   No.   Total
 victims crime   serious   of   No.
  Share   Crime   Serious =  
(b) 
s respondent   of   No.   Total
 victims crime   of   No.
  Rate   Crime =    
(f)  Share   Crime   Serious   -   1   Share   Crime Light  =  
(c) 
s respondent   of   No.   Total
 victims crime   serious   of   No.
  Rate   Crime   Serious =   (g) 
Rate   Crime
Rate   Bribe
  Ratio   Crime    to Bribe =  
(d)  Rate   Crime   Serious   -   Rate   Crime   Rate   Crime Light  =    50 
 
TABLE A2: Variable Names and Sources 
ICVS 
Variables  Individual characteristics  Definition (Source)  
bribe  Bribe or Corruption  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is asked for bribe, 0 otherwise (A)  
crime Crime 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent was a victim to any of 13 types of criminal 
offence: car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, theft of motorcycle/moped, bicycle 
theft, burglary, attempt at burglary, theft from garages, robbery, theft of personal 
property, sexual offences, assaults and threats, and consumer fraud, 0 otherwise (A)  
SC Serious  Crime 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent was a crime victim and considered the crime to 
be “very serious” or “fairly serious”, 0 otherwise (A)  
LC Light  Crime 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent was a crime victim but did not consider the 
crime to be “very serious” or “fairly serious”, 0 otherwise (A)  
smalltown Small  city   
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a population of 50,000 
less (A)  
medtown Middle-size  city   
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a population of 50,000 
to 1 million (A)  
largetown Large  City 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a population over 1 
million (A)  
male  Male   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is male, 0 otherwise (A)  
agebelow35  Age between 16–34  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 16 and 34, 0 otherwise (A)  
age35to60  Age between 35–59   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 35 and 59, 0 otherwise (A)  
ageabove60  Age 60 and above  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is 60 years old or above, 0 otherwise (A)  
upperincome Upper  income   
Dummy variable (=1) if the family income is in the upper 50% of the country, 0 
otherwise (A)  
married Married   
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise i.e. single, widowed, 
living together or divorced(A)  
education years Education   Years of education of the respondent (A)  
working  Working   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is working, 0 otherwise (A)  
lookwork  Looking for job   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is looking for job, 0 otherwise (A)  
homekeeper  Home keeper   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is house keeper, 0 otherwise (A)  
retired  Retired/disabled   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is retired or disabled, 0 otherwise (A)  
at school  Student   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is still at school, 0 otherwise (A)  
otherwork Other   
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is in other occupational position, 0 otherwise 
(A)  
army  Army  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is in the army, 0 otherwise (A)  51 
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Country 
Variables 
Country characteristics   Definition (Source)  
Deap  East Asia and Pacific   Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in East Asia and Pacific, 0 otherwise  
Dla 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in Latin America and Caribbean, 0 otherwise  
DSA  South Africa   Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in South Africa, 0 otherwise  
DSSAf  Sub Saharan Africa  Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in Sub Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise  
DNAm 
United States, Canada, and 
Bermuda  
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the United States, Canada, or Bermuda, 0 
otherwise  
DMENAf 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the Middle East and North Africa, 0 otherwise 
DEuCA  Europe and Central Asia  Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the Europe and Central Asia, 0 otherwise  
lpop  Population   Population of the country in millions in the survey year, expressed in Log (C)  
unemployment Unemployment  rate    Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (C) 
reg1000 Regulatory  Burden 
Cost and time involved in carrying out the procedures a start-up entrepreneur has to 
comply with in order to obtain a legal status, as a share of 1999 per capita GDP, 
multiplied by 1000 to rescale (E) 
rol  Rule of law 
Synthetic index, rescaled adding 4 points to the index to avoid negative values where a 




Human Development Indicator from UNDP, where higher values denote higher 
development (D) 
lgnp  Gross National Income  Log of Gross National Income per capita, PPP, (current international $) (C) 
fem_male  Female to Male ratio  Ratio of Female Population, female (% of total) to male (% of total) (C) 




GINI coefficient (C) 
happy_ls10 
Happiness Index of Life 
Satisfaction 
Life Satisfaction on a 10-step numerical scale. Typical item: Taking all together, how 
satisfied are you with your life-as-a-whole these days? 1 very dissatisfied to 10 very 
satisfied. Higher number denotes higher life satisfaction  (H) 
econ_free Economic  Freedom 
Heritage Index of : -1) limitations to trade, 2) fiscal burden, 3) government 
intervention, 4) monetary policy, 5) limitation to foreign investment, 6) limitations to 
banking, 7) Control of wages and prices, 8) limitations to property rights, 9) regulation, 
10) international market (www.heritage.org) (H) 
press  Freedom of Press 
Index of restrictions on media content 1) laws and regulations (0-15 points, 2) political 
pressures and controls (0-15 points), 3 repressive actions (e.g. killing journalists, 
censorship) (0-5 points). More point means less freedom. Rated: 1 (free)  to 3 (unfree) 
(Freedom House: Press Freedom Survey) (H) 52 
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Country 
Variables 
Country characteristics   Definition (Source)  
govinter Government  Intervention 
Index of: a) government consumption in % of economy, b) government ownership of 
business, c) share of government revenues from state-owned enterprises and property, 
d) economic output produced by government. Rated: 1 (free) to 5 (unfree) 
(www.heritage.org) (H) 
controlw 
Government Control of 
Wages and Prices 
Index of: a) minimum wage laws, b) freedom to set prices, c) government price 
controls, d) extend to which government price controls are used, e) government 
subsidies to businesses that affect prices. Rated: 1 (free) to 5 (unfree) 
(www.heritage.org) (H) 
informal Informal Sector 
Index of: a) smuggling, b) piracy of intellectual property in the informal market, c) 
agricultural production supplied by the informal market, d) manufacturing supplied by 
the informal market, e) services supplied on the informal market, f) transportation 
supplied on the informal market, g) labor supplied on the informal market. Rated: 1 
(free) to 5 (unfree)  (www.heritage.org) (H) 
Source:       
A ICVS  http://www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/index.php 
C WDI  www.worldbank.org/data 
D HDR,  UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 






World Database of 
Happiness 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
 